Topline Findings:
1. With the DMDK (Vijay Kant) the third force in the state aligning with the AIDMK, the political battle in Tamil Nadu reverts back to its bi-polar character from a tri-polar one as seen in 2009. The Index of Opposition Unity (IOU) correspondingly rises sharply.
2. Normally a higher IOU bolsters the opposition chances to victory. This advantage is however swamped by electoral arithmetic being stacked heavily against the opposition AIDMK alliance. If 2009 Lok Sabha performance is used as a benchmark, then the AIDMK alliance appears considerably less formidable than their DMK rivals, trailing by a whopping 9-11%. A two digit vote share margin can result in landslide win, similar in scale to what the AIDMK achieved during the 2001 Assembly elections. The AIDMK alliance then won 197 out of the 234 seats, with the AIDMK gaining a majority on their own. This raises the hope of DMK to replicate the AIDMK’s landslide win of 2001 but factoring anti-incumbency, the battle could still be a cliff hanger, if not ending in a stunning surprise.
3. If the start up vote share holds, the Indian National Congress (INC) is poised to be the second largest party in the state. In the eventuality of any DMK split due to family feuds post the death or incapacitation of DMK patriarch, Karunanidhi, the Congress positions itself to play the role of a key partner of one DMK faction in a scenario where the AIADMK begins entering into a phase of terminal decline.
4. While both have a pan Tamil Nadu presence, the DMK core vote base as per their showing in 2009 is estimated around 28%, while those of the AIDMK is only around 22%. This difference of 6% between the respective poles of the two alliances is what gives the DMK alliance a platform to build a formidable alliance in addition to offering greater flexibility in picking and choosing its partners. At the level of constituents, the top 3 parties within the DMK alliance have a combined vote that decisively crosses 40% while the AIDMK struggles to cross this mark even having 14 political parties within its umbrella. To give DMK a run for its money, the AIDMK should either have the PMK or the Congress, preferably the latter. The entire story of this election maybe encapsulated here. But is it? Once pre-poll studies are published in the days ahead, we can get a better picture.
5. Corruption is likely to be by and large a non-issue, given that AIDMK and its leader Jayalalithaa has previously been embroiled in many a corruption scam. Accordingly a campaign that focuses on the 2G scam would be akin to a pot calling the kettle black! Apart from providing some marginal dividends to AIDMK in some urban pockets of the state, it is highly unlikely to touch a chord with the electorate. Instead, the arrest of Raja, ex Telecom Minister at the centre could even help the DMK alliance wean away significant sections of Dalits who are largely one of the backbones of the AIDMK political coalition. In the case of a landslide win by the DMK, it is expected to deflate the high decibel opposition campaign in what is known as the 2G scam.
6. The AIDMK alliance needs at least a 5% swing by Election Day to ensure a dead heat, if not forge into the lead. This though not impossible, looks a very tall order, given that the dice of electric arithmetic is heavily loaded against them. However an imaginative campaign could close the gap it faces. The AIDMK alliance could perhaps take a leaf out of Chandra Babu Naidu, opposition leader in Andhra Pradesh who bolstered his personal stock by taking on the for-profit micro-finance industry in the state. Banning the latter or castrating them like Andhra Pradesh did through legislation could provide an issue that offer some promise in generating some vote share swing in their favour.The AIDMK's best chances lie in the DMDK's capacity to mop up anti-incumbency votes and transfer them in full to the alliance. But whether this happens at all remain the moot question.
Background
The defining feature of all national coalition politics from 1999 had been Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu being the key game changer states. During this period, no government could be formed at the centre without their key participation. Governed by regional parties, the state accordingly wields a clout, largely disproportionate to their actual numbers at the centre.
The politics of Tamil Nadu for a long time had been the story of the bitter rivalry between the two stalwarts of the Tamil film industry, friends turned foes, M. Karunanidhi and MG Ramachandran (MGR). After having been a faithful follower of the DMK and Karunanidhi for long, MGR who till then had kept himself out of electoral politics successfully managed to create a huge political force (AIDMK) with his entry into politics. It was then carried forward briefly by his late wife, and then by his friend, co-star and protégé, Jayalalithaa.
The politics till the last decade of the 20th century in the State was therefore was more about being pro-MGR (AIDMK) or pro-Karunanidhi (DMK). Caste initially did neither matter nor religion, both had support within all religions and caste and the supporters were equally passionate about their leaders. But as caste and to a lesser extent, religious parties began to be formed and assert themselves during the last decade, the two Dravidian parties, began to experience a progressive decline in their vote share so much they are now at sub-critical levels preventing winning elections on their own steam. To overcome these limitations, the two started contesting in alliances. So the last decade witnessed coalitional politics in the state characterized by a contest essentially led by two political poles- the DMK and AIDMK respectively.
Another peculiar characteristic of Tamil Nadu is its huge propensity to deliver highly one sided verdicts. One alliance normally gets more or less wiped out, while the other makes a sweep. In 2001, AIDMK clobbered together a formidable alliance that included the Tamil Manila Congress (TMC); INC; PMK, CPM, CPI, Forward Bloc; Indian National League (INL); Republican Party of India (RPI) and some independents. A gap of more than 10 per cent translated into a massive 197 of the 234 seats victory for the ADMK-led alliance with the ADMK alone winning 132 seats.
In the 2004 General Elections, an alliance led by the DMK clean swept the state 40-0 despite being decimated by the AIDMK in the Assembly polls four years earlier. The DMK alliance then included the re-united Congress (after the merger of Tamil Manila Congress with its parent body); the two Communist parties; the PMK and the MDMK. Because the decimation of the opposition was as comprehensive as it could be as reflected in the 40-0 result, 2004 is widely considered by political pundits as the benchmark for the ultimate formidability of the DMK alliance.
Since the two Dravidian parties became progressively weaker during the last decade in this state, issues do not matter as cold alliance arithmetic to all political parties. In the absence of ideology, allies bolting from one alliance in one election only to return back in the next are therefore a common phenomenon. True to form, by the time of the next General Election in 2009 came about, the DMK alliance accordingly lost a good chunk of their formidability with MDMK, PMK, CPI and CPM bolting from its stables. With most polls predicting an AIDMK win, the DMK alliance stunned pundits by running away with 70% of the seats. This they had to thank the polity of the state changing from a bi-polar contest to a tri-polar contest due to the emergence of a relatively new party, DMDK, led by another film star, Vijay Kant, who ran away with over 10% of the votes. The Index of Opposition Unity (IOU) being low gave the DMK alliance a strike rate of 70%.
Tamil Nadu during the last decade had been the Waterloo for psephologists. The frequent changes within an alliance are part of the problem. Poll forecasts often tend to be prone to carry errors of both omission and commission in the constituent membership of alliances as forecasters get confused which party belongs to which coalition. Additionally, as and when they switch alliances, it is difficult to get a sense of their intrinsic popular support, since it is only when political parties contest on their own that realistic estimates can be drawn. For example PMK claims an individual vote share of 7% but it is difficult to ascertain their veracity since the last time they contested on their own was way back in 1991.
Partly Tamil Nadu proving the pollster’s nightmare is also accounted by the changing character of state elections to a tri-polar contest, increasing the complexity to forecast seats. With the DMDK, the third force during the last election, now contesting within the AIDMK coalition umbrella, the state has reverted back to a bi-polar contest that makes poll forecasting very much more less hazardous as compared to their experience of the last decade!
So What’s Different this Election?
Both alliances have expanded their constituent party numbers since 2009 - the number of parties within the AIDMK going up from 5 to 14 and the DMK from 3 to 7.
UPDATE
Under the deal early this week, DMK will contest 121 seats, PMK 30, Viduthlalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK)10, Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam 7, IUML two and Moovender Munetra Kazhagam one, the last two seeking election on the DMK symbol.
In the rainbow alliance led by opposition AIADMK, DMDK floated by actor Vijaykant has been allotted 41 seats, Manitha Neya Munnetra Kazhagam three, Puthiya Tamizhagam two, Samathuva Makkal Katchi of actor Sarathkumar two and Natalum Makkal Katchi floated by actor Karthick, All India Moovendar Munnetra Kazhagam, AIFB, Kongu Makkal Ilaignar Peravai and RPI one each. The alliance with the MDMK, CPI and CPM are uncertain with negotiations hitting a road block.
The 2009 General Election results could be used as the bench mark to get a sense of the formidability of the alliances in the state. The table above provides a snapshot of the last parliamentary elections but the one below illustrates better the difference between the central poles of the two alliances:
It is evident from the table that while the DMK as the leader of its alliance is strong enough to lift the vote share of the entire alliance by performing better than the other constituents, the AIADMK being totally discredited and on the decline has lost this ability. The AIDMK is in fact piggy backing on its allies rather than the other way around. The AIDMK was even not able to capitalise on anti-incumbency factors gifted by its rival DMK that controls the government in the state as these votes were gleefully mopped up by the DMDK led by film actor, Vijay Kant.
The starting line-up for the DMK is accordingly 42.68% as there is no desertion within its ranks since 2009. It augments its strength further by bringing into the alliance - the PMK with 6.75% vote share; KNMK who contested the parliamentary elections independently and recorded a vote share of 1.99% and two minor parties like the IUML and MMK that together has a vote share around 2%. Adding up to 12%, this when added to the DMK vote kitty of 2009 gives the alliance a whopping 52% of the votes, at least on paper. Under the first passed the post system, such a vote share makes the alliance almost impregnable.
The starting line-up for the AIDMK is 38.74%, which when adjusted for desertions within its ranks (PMK with vote share of 6.75%) would drop to 32%. To offset this decline, the AIDMK brings within its fold the DMDK that recorded a vote share of 10.1 in the last parliamentary elections and eight other smaller parties that together command another 2%. This gives the AIDMK alliance a vote share around 43% at least on paper.
The two alliances (DMK & AIDMK) accordingly control a whopping 95% of the votes, making the present contest basically a bi-polar one. In 2009, the DMDK in contrast acted as the third force as it positioned as an alternative to both the alliances. Accordingly, the DMDK ate into the vote share of all the major players. Though founded only in 2005 quickly touched the 10% mark in 4 years. The DMDK hopes its growth momentum continues to enable it to reach a vote share of 15% these elections. However, it is more likely to see a massive erosion in its vote bank.
The DMDK is widely seen as a Congress prop, designed to cut the votes of its rival, a role another film actor, Chiranjeevi played to perfection in Andhra Pradesh. The entire growth of the party had been financed and with the blessings of the Congress. While ties with the Congress still continues even as the DMDK joined the rival AIDMK, Congress finance for its current election has dried up, throwing a spanner into the momentum growth of the party. Further, since the DMDK had positioned itself as an alternative for both - the DMK and the AIADMK - in the previous polls, its vote bank could see significant level erosion since it has aligned with the AIADMK.
So to what level could its erosion be? We estimate this around 2% overall. This would bring down the vote share of the AIDMK alliance to near sub-40% levels, giving over a double digit lead to its rival DMK alliance. In the 2001 Assembly elections, a lead of 10% translated into a landslide win for the AIDMK alliance. It won a massive 197 of the 234 seats with the AIADMK alone winning 132. Such a double digit lead could see the DMK trying to replicate the 2001 results.
But it has to be kept in mind that while the real contribution of the DMDK to the AIADMK alliance vote kitty maybe around 8%, by piggy backing on the alliance and contesting 44 seats, the DMDK may still make headway to realise its dreams of recording 15% vote share or near about - the additional 7% is what the AIDMK alliance contributes to its vote kitty.
The DMDK got 8.38% votes in 2006 elections and bettered its performance by securing 10.08% votes in the parliamentary elections in 2009. The DMDK secured more than 20,000 votes in 27 assembly segments, more than 15,000 votes in 75 segments, more than 10,000 votes in 169 segments and more than 5,000 votes in 228. In the last Assembly election, the DMDK secured only one seat. But this time, by piggy backing on the AIDMK, it hopes to get a haul of 15 seats. This is the most likely outcome as DMDK supporters are likely to vote in constituencies where their party is contesting in large numbers and mass abstains from voting where the party is not contesting. In short, the full transferability of the DMDK vote to the AIDMK is greatly in doubt. The party itself will concentrate its campaign in the 27 seats it secured more than 20,000 votes. The result: while its own Alliance gets thrashed, the DMDK makes a quantum leap in evolving as a major contender for power in the future.
So Can AIDMK Bridge the Gap?
The AIDMK alliance needs to whip up a 5% swing to target a dead heat, if not forge into the lead in the next 30 days. Is this even possible? Affirmative. The DMK being in government is vulnerable to the anti-incumbency effect and thus the possibility always exists. But is this even probable? This remains a more difficult question.
Why?
Since the formation of the DMDK who positions itself as an alternative to both the DMK and AIDMK, it was this party that was the primary beneficiary of mopping up the anti-incumbency vote in the state and as a result put a spanner in the wheel of AIDMK to make a comeback as it deprived the latter of the anti-incumbency vote.
This also seem to suggest that the AIDMK is too discredited for anti-incumbency votes to be attracted to it as an alternative magnet. The growth of the DMDK is more likely to be an indicator of the increasing public fatigue with both the Dravidian parties. Now with the DMDK within the AIDMK umbrella, the alliance looks to the former to boost it vote share by continuing to mop up the anti-incumbency vote which in turn boosts the vote share of the entire alliance. Simply put if the DMDK is to contribute 15% (than the 10% it demonstrated in 2009) to the AIDMK alliance vote share, then the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections immediately competitively livens up instead of being a drab one-sided affair.
As explained earlier, leave alone anti-incumbency it is expected to garner this elections, it looks highly unlikely that the DMDK will totally transfer its core votes to the AIDMK alliance as a whole. At best it should transfer only a fraction of its total vote. This character would possibly give the DMDK a higher strike rate than the AIDMK alliance as a whole under whose banner it currently contests under.
So if the AIDMK intends to generate a 5% swing in its favour, rather than look to the DMDK growth momentum to generate it, the AIDMK should identify an issue that cuts an emotional chord with the people. In the 2G Spectrum scam involving A Raja, DMK ex-Minister of Telecom Ministry at the centre, the AIDMK think it found such an issue. But the record of the AIDMK, particularly its party supermo, Jayalalithaa, is equally sullied and that’s the reason why Tamil Nadu voted her out.
Trying to capitalize on the 2G scam would be akin to a pot calling the kettle black. The wily patriarch of the DMK realized very early an opportunity in a crisis by declaring that Raja was being targeted only being a Dalit. The net outcome could possibly be that the some vote gains in a few urban pockets are more or less offset by weaning away some of the Dalits who are among the major support base of the AIDMK. In short, what Jayalalithaa gains in the swings she may end up losing in the roundabout by focussing on the 2G scam. In the days ahead, opinion polls would provide a greater insight whether corruption can be a winning issue.
Caveats
1. This analysis is based solely on the party performance of the Lok Sabha elections in 2009 and not based on any opinion polls. Besides both alliances are yet to firm up agreements with their respective constituents and neither alliance have even begun candidate selection yet. Accordingly, the confidence levels of this study is extremely low but all the same there is nothing to suggest it it cannot be representative of broad trends blowing at the start line of the campaign.
2. The next few weeks will see a spate of opinion polls hitting the market which will provide a better sense in changes in vote share since 2009. This blog would re-produce these as well as those in Assam and West Bengal who are also going to polls. In the first week of April, we will publish a more detailed seat forecast and another as a commentary on exit poll results. This post is to be treated as more as a backgrounder to the election to the state
About the Author: Rajan Alexander is a management consultant in the non-profit sector who dabbles in psephology as a hobby just to cook a snook at professional opinion and exit polls. When the latter during the Lok Sabha 2005 was predicting a Jayalalithaa-BJP win in Tamil Nadu, Rajan predicted their complete rout, a 40-0 win for the DMK-Congress alliance, which came to pass. In the 2009 Lok Sabha, Rajan predicted 27-30 seats for the DMK-Congress alliance, who secured 28 seats.
